Saturday, April 6, 2013
India needs to tame SARFAESI Act
See article by Vinod Kothari and Soma Bagaria in January 2013 issue of the Chartered Secretary here:
http://www.icsi.edu/docs/cs/January%202013/January2013.pdf
http://www.icsi.edu/docs/cs/January%202013/January2013.pdf
Friday, March 15, 2013
Securitisation trusts get stay on demand
While the Budget 2013 might have created a different sort of problem altogether, it seems the recovery of demand from mutual funds or securitization SPVs, holding them as non-tax-transparent, is to wait for some time. See the ruling of the Bombay High court here:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/No-public-authority-can-ignore-principle-of-legal-precedent-Bombay-high-court/articleshow/18991394.cms
Let no one make a mistake - this ruling does not decide anything at all on the substance of the case. It is only a ruling on the recovery of demand pending an appeal. Hence, the issue of whether existing securitisation transactions are tax transparent still remains.
In the meantime, the Indian securitisation industry is expected to be reacting soon on the Budget 2013 proposals.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/No-public-authority-can-ignore-principle-of-legal-precedent-Bombay-high-court/articleshow/18991394.cms
Let no one make a mistake - this ruling does not decide anything at all on the substance of the case. It is only a ruling on the recovery of demand pending an appeal. Hence, the issue of whether existing securitisation transactions are tax transparent still remains.
In the meantime, the Indian securitisation industry is expected to be reacting soon on the Budget 2013 proposals.
Friday, March 1, 2013
Budget 2013 proposals on securitisation
The Budget 2013 changes completely the tax structure of securitisation transactions in India. They wanted to be good, but ended up confused. See my detailed analysis at:
www.vinodkothari.com/secart.htm
Please do sign up for securtisation mailing list on:
www.vinodkothari.com/mailinglist.htm
You are missing a lot if you are not on the groups there.
best
Vinod Kothari
vinod@vinodkothari.com
Tuesday, December 11, 2012
SARFAESI Amendment bill passed in Lok Sabha
News items on 11th Dec 2012 say that the Enforcement of Security Interests and Debt Recovery Laws Amendment Bill has been cleared by the Lok Sabha.
The Bill is insignificant, and makes minimum amendments to the SARFAESI Act.
One amendment, for example, relates to multi-state cooperatives, which, owing to certain court rulings, were currently excluded from the purview of the law.
Yet another amendment is the right of a secured creditor to file a caveat before DRTs, so that borrowers do not obtain ex parte stay.
Yet another amendment allows an ARC to convert debt into equity.
Text of the Bill is here: http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Enforcement/Enforcement%20of%20Security%20Interest%20and%20Recovery%20of%20Debts%20Laws%20Amendment)%20Bill%202011.pdf
The Bill is insignificant, and makes minimum amendments to the SARFAESI Act.
One amendment, for example, relates to multi-state cooperatives, which, owing to certain court rulings, were currently excluded from the purview of the law.
Yet another amendment is the right of a secured creditor to file a caveat before DRTs, so that borrowers do not obtain ex parte stay.
Yet another amendment allows an ARC to convert debt into equity.
Text of the Bill is here: http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Enforcement/Enforcement%20of%20Security%20Interest%20and%20Recovery%20of%20Debts%20Laws%20Amendment)%20Bill%202011.pdf
Saturday, October 13, 2012
Publication of defaulting borrowers' photos in SARFAESI notices
Publication of photographs of home loan borrowers in SARFAESI
notices: Are we doing the right thing?
The title puts a question, and it is easy to imagine a counter question too – is the borrower defaulting on the bank’s money is doing the right thing? This article examines the wrong involved in defaulting on loan commitments, but puts a bigger question before the society : are we rightly reacting to the borrower’s default? The article is particularly focused on home loans.
Before we get into the question – let us be aware of what is
happening around us. The SARFAESI Act was enacted in 2002 presumably on the
lines of the article 9 of US Uniform Commercial Code. The Act is, actually,
nowhere even close to that Code. In fact, UCC deals with personal property and
not real estate, and therefore, home loans are not at all covered by US UCC
article 9. The Act was recommended before the Parliament as one which help
reduce the burden of bank NPAs. The picture one got was those so-called
“wilful” defaulters who habitually over-borrow from banks, siphon off money
possibly even before the loan repayment
starts, and enjoy life at the cost of banks. In other words, the objective was
to be stern against promoters of companies that go sick while promoters enjoy
the pink of their own health. Little did the Parliamentarians who passed the
law realise that the law will be used, as it is being done, vehemently to drag
home loan borrowers out of their homes.
No one contends that a borrower should be allowed to go scot
free after having borrowed money from a bank or housing finance company, even
if it was purchase of a residential house. But is a default of a home loan a
case of wilful default that was in the minds of the lawmakers when the SARFAESI
Act was enacted? Is it difficult to envisage that there may be zillion reasons
for which a borrower may be forced to default on loan EMIs? Once again,
financial discipline is important, and it is a settled fact that home borrowers
who are unable to pay their EMIs have to suffer foreclosure at some stage.
There are hundreds of thousands of such
homes under foreclosure action today in the USA, and therefore, no one should
shed tears if borrowers have to face a mortgage foreclosure on account of
default of a home loan.
But then, the SARFAESI Act puts a non-judicial route to
mortgage foreclosures. The way the section is worded, a home borrower will first have to lose the
roof over his head before he can run to his lawyer to take an action in a DRT.
One just needs to take a practical stock of the situation – a person having a
salary income of Rs 30000 pm takes a loan that has an EMI of Rs 10000 per
month. The ratio works perfectly fine since a debt to income ratio of 33% is
one of the best a lender can expect. Also, given that a household can easily
manage living costs within a range of 10-15k per month, there is sufficient
scope for the individual to pay his home loan without default. Now, say, he
loses his job. It obviously will take a few months before he can get a
replacement job, particularly in a market as the present one. So, 3 EMIs
missing, and the bank classifies the loan as an NPA. The bank sends a loan
recall notice, demanding not just 3 EMIs, but the whole of the loan. And in the
meantime, the bank starts adding penal interest, which is much higher than the
loan interest rate.
The issue is, where
does the individual, out of job and facing his own worries in life trying to
find a new job, get the money from, to pay the bank? Not just the EMIs, but the
lethal penal interest rate too. So, as would always happen – debt begets debt.
He would possibly run to a usurious lender, and borrow at excessive interests
to pay the bank off, but sooner or later, will get into a default at both the
places.
Here comes the bank with a SARFSAESI notice – pay off the entire loan, along with penal interest and
all other charges within 60 days, or face repossession.
The tragedy is, the individual can run to no one for rescue.
He would often run with pleading face to the branch manager, but the manager
would say – the matter is out of control now.
Now think of remedies available. Is it unlikely that the borrower
may have questioned the very claim of the bank? Is it unlikely that the bank
might have added wrongful costs or charges which the individual may be
disputing? Thanks to the Supreme Court ruling in Mardia Chemicals, the law
gives the borrower a right of representation, but the right of representation
is a mere lipservice, as the representation goes to the very bank or bank
manager with whom the borrower has an issue. The law does not even require the
borrower’s grievance to be handled by a senior office who can examine the
matter dispassionately. Invariably, if at all the borrower makes a
representation, the answer from the bank is going to be mechanical – turning
down the representation with a stereotyped rebuttal of whatever the borrower
might have said.
So, can the borrower approach his lawyer and seek a
redressal? Unfortunately, as the law seems to say, the borrower must first
allow the bank to take action (read, take away the borrower’ house), and go for redressal before a DRT. DRT action
may stretch for months altogether. To add to the injury, the DRT may also pass
an order for pre-deposit of a large part of the amount demanded by the bank
before the application can proceed. Irony is – if the borrower had the money to
pre-deposit, why would he let the loan default anyways? But law is merciless, regardless,
and concern-less.
Banks are adding insult to the injury by publishing the
borrowers’ photographs in the newspapers. This is simply outrageous. The matter
was discussed in a Madras High Court ruling where the High court affirmed of the practice,
but the issue was mainly on the grounds of borrowers’ privacy rights, bank
secrecy laws, and so on. Our Courts have still not got rid of the mindset that
when a borrower defaults, he is not necessarily defaulting because he is not
wanting to pay, but because he is unable to pay. Also, over the decades of the
way the banking system has worked, courts are simply unable to appreciate the
miseries of retail borrower failing to pay a
consumer loan. Therefore, it is a little surprise that the Hon. Judge in
the Madras High court above said: “If borrowers could find newer and newer
methods to avoid repayment of the loans, the Banks are also entitled to invent
novel methods to recover their dues.” This indicates that the publication of
the photo of the borrower is also a recovery device, whereas, it was not
pointed out before the court that the photo is published only after the
recovery action has been taken.
Repossession action having been taken, the question is – why
would a bank at all want to do a further damage to the borrower by publishing
his photograph too? Surely enough, it is
not the photo of an India’s-most-wanted terrorist to caution the public.
If the idea is to caution other lenders, that is taken care of by CIBIL as the
financial system is anyway entitled to CIBIL’s database. In any case, other
lenders don’t lend by looking at the photo of the borrower. One would
understand if default of a loan was a criminal offence, but first, a loan
default is a civil wrong and not a criminal wrong, second, no one could hold a
person liable of having done a crime other than a criminal court, let alone a
commercial bank, and third, even in
criminal wrongs, for the most heinous crimes, courts do not go all out to publish
photographs.
Irrespective of legality involved in such publication, what
is happening currently is outright wrong. Our brethren who have fallen victims
of bad times and are anyway deprived of the roof over their head are being
further driven into ignominy by putting their photographs in papers. This is so
very cruel, so very inhuman, at least in case of residential mortgage loans.
RBI and NHB should put an end to this practice immediately.
Foreign investments in ARCs and security receipts
I have commented, several times, that the ARC model in India in unique and has nothing to do with similar models elsewhere in the world, in more senses than one. Special statutory powers have been conferred in India on ARCs, while ARCs in India are profit-driven shareholder companies unlike state-promoted special purpose vehicles in other countries. In India, the ARCs are nothing but a surrogate route to a special situations fund or a distressed debt fund, coupled with special powers of recoveries.
The special powers granted under the SARFAESI Act and under
the Sick Industrial Companies Act are drastic, and at least in cases, seem to
be exceeding the boundaries of well-settled public policies. For example, one
of the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies Act, recently interpreted by
the Bombay High court , says that if any loan taken by a sick company is
acquired by an ARC, then the reference of the sick company before the BIFR
shall abate. Seemingly, the only purpose of constituting the BIFR is that
entities which may be revived are sent to the nursing home and not the
crematorium. But if any loan, irrespective of the amount of the loan, taken by
such sick company, is acquired by an ARC, and that causes the reference before
the BIFR to cede, the very philosophy of the revival of sick companies gets
negated.
Same are the provisions in sec 9 of the SARFAESI Act about
takeover of management. An ARC that has bought a loan taken by a defaulting
borrower has the right to takeover the management of the business of the
borrower. Notably, the loan was originally given by a bank, and the bank never
had any such right of takeover of management. The ARC that buys the loan from
the bank cannot have a better right than that of the bank. The bank had a
security interest; security interest cannot imply the right of takeover of
business.
There are also issues concerning workers’ interest which
have not been properly appreciated: workers’ claims are recognised under
SARFAESI proceedings only where the company is in liquidation. Sadly enough,
the very repossession of assets by an ARC may leave the borrower with no
substratum at all, and therefore, with no option but to go for liquidation. But
by this time, as the core assets of the borrower would have been taken away by
the secured lender, the question is – where do the workers get paid from?
These are generic concerns about the whole scheme of ARCs ,
which seem to have been pushed into legislation without a holistic approach to
resolution of bankruptcies in the country.
However, the present policy about FDI in ARCs and the
security receipts (SRs) issued by the ARCs may also be reviewed.
Currently, non-residents are allowed to invest in capital of
ARCs, but FIIs are not allowed. As regards investments in SRs, FIIs are allowed
to invest upto 49% of a single tranche of SRs, with a limit of 10% per FII.
As regards ARCs themselves, the 49% cap was perhaps devised
to ensure ARCs may end up owning bad loans, and bad loans may (a) pertain to
borrowers from sectors where there are current restrictions on foreign
investments; and (b) be backed by real estate whereby foreign investors may end
up owning immovable properties, which may be against the extant FDI policy.
These concerns may, however, be misplaced. First of all,
most ARCs do not invest in bad loans themselves – they do it mostly by issuing
SRs in the trust mode. Therefore, as long as there are prudent restrictions on
investment in SRs, the restriction on equity capital of ARCs may not be
necessary. Secondly, even if an ARC with, say, majority foreign ownership, ends
up buying bad loans of a borrower where there are sectoral caps, this does not
lead to creation of equity stakes in such sector. The acquisition of an NPL
does not mean acquisition of equity or ownership of the business of the
borrower. True, ARCs have the power to cause change of management or takeover
the management as well, but the so-called takeover of management under
SARFSAESI Act is not buyout of a business. The law says that the takeover shall
be only for the purpose of realisation of the loans, and once the loans
have been realised, the business will be
handed back to the original owners. Takeover of management of business is a
rarity – ARCs have caused management change, but have never so far taken over
management themselves.
It is to be noted that SRs are essentially in the nature of
equity – since the returns on the SRs depend on the money realised on recovery
of the underlying loans. Though the RBI’s directions to ARCs put a maximum time
frame for realisation of loans acquired by ARCs, practically, the repayment of
the SRs depends on the realisation of the underlying loans. Hence, investment
in SRs is more like an FDI than ECB. However, it is an FDI into the loans, and
not FDI into the business from where the loan emanates – thus, not conflicting
with the current FDI policy.
How would investment in SRs help Indian economy? Currently,
given the restriction of 49% on investment in SRs, most SRs are being
subscribed either by the banks that sell the NPLs themselves, or domestic NBFCs
that qualify as “qualified institutional buyers.” Internationally, distressed
debt has attracted international investors – this is particularly true for
China. SRs in India make more sense than distressed debt in China, as ARCs in
India are vested with special powers.
Therefore, there is a strong case for relaxing the limit of
49% in case of SRs. Is this likely to attract lot of money into the country? Given
the soaring amount of NPLs and loans undergoing restructuring, the amount of
NPLs in India will rise sharply in time to come. This may be the right time to
attract international investors.
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